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Abstract. 
This paper will have a closer look at the role of South African welfare programs on the labour supply 
decision across generations. From a theoretical point of view, a change in non-labour household income 
will affect the decision to participate in the labour market. Previous studies have focused on prime age 
adults and elderly and could confirm a significant decrease in labour supply of individuals living in a 
pensioner’s household. However, past research did not look at the intergenerational pattern and 
broader socio-economic conditions when evaluating the impacts of social grants. Our preliminary results 
suggest that the behavioural response to welfare programs differs by age group. In particular, labour 
supply of the young living in a pensioner's household has increased. Also, intergenerational differences 
in participation rates can be explained by educational policies, designed specifically to address over-age 
students in the public schooling system. 
JEL classification: J22, H53   2 
1  Motivation 
 
Large scale social transfer systems are still rare in developing countries. Since the end of Apartheid, 
South Africa has implemented a comprehensive social security system  including various grants 
addressing the needs of children, a disability grant, and old age pensions covering all population groups.
 
In total, the social safety net reached 13 million beneficiaries in 2008. Of particular importance are the 
child support grant, whose eligibility criteria have been changed repeatedly since its introduction in 
1998 to increase the number of children benefitting from it (currently ca. 8.7 million), as well as the old 
age grant supporting 2.3 elderly people in 2008 (Department of Social Development, 2009).
 1  
The explicit aim of unconditional cash transfers is to provide income support to the poor and vulnerable. 
Assigned to poor families and poor elderly once they arrive at the official retirement age, cash transfers 
as the child support grant and state pensions are likely to substantially increase non-labour household 
income. Previous studies assessing the impact of public transfer programs in South Africa identified 
significant effects on  expenditure on food, clothing,  and savings, the nutritional status  and school 
attendance rates  of children a s well as on labour force participation rates. Also, most studies find 
significant gender differences, therefore rejecting the unitary household model and perfect pooling of 
incomes. In terms of effective targeting results suggest that the welfare effects of the child support 
grant almost entirely accrue to the child who is receiving the grant, whereas household members living 
in a pensioner household often benefit from the additional income, too.   
Regarding the effect on labour force participation,  past s tudies have focused on prime age adults 
(Bertrand, 2003) and persons aged 50 years and older (Ranchhod, 2006). For both age groups significant 
decreases in labour supply have been found.  The authors  conclude  that the government needs to 
carefully reconsider the incentives provided by the various welfare programs. Posel et al. (2006) and 
Ardington et al. (2007) also analyse the behavioural changes induced by pensions and arrive at a more 
positive conclusion. They find that in particular labour migration seem to increase among prime age 
adult household members suggesting that  pension money plays a crucial role in overcoming credit 
constraints.  
This paper will have a closer look at the role of old age pension and child support grant on the labour 
supply decision across generations. Past studies have approached this question in a rather static and 
isolated way, i.e. not considering the changing economic environment and labour market conditions. In 
                                                            
1 There are few more large-scale social transfer programs in developing countries.  During the 1990s, China 
introduced the urban minimum living standards program to protect poor and vulnerable households. In 2005, India 
introduced the national rural employment guarantee scheme to address rural poverty. When fully implemented, 
each program will cover 24 million households.  The productive safety net program in Ethiopia is the largest social 
protection program in Sub-Saharan Africa outside South Africa, currently reaching 7 million households (Scott, 
2009).   3 
order to address these issues, we construct a birth cohort panel dataset covering the years 1995-2007. 
Preliminary results suggest that the effects of social grants are profoundly different for younger and 
older generations.  
2  Methodology and Data 
 
The targeting of social grants is in many instances age related. Social pensions are granted to women 
above the age of 60 and men above the age of 65, who pass the means test. Child Support Grants are 
granted to mothers that take care of children below the age of 18. It therefore seems obvious that 
labour supply decisions in response to social assistance should vary across age groups. However, the 
picture is not that simple. Households are formed around social grants, so that labour supply of those 
living with pensioners declines (Bertrand et. al., 2003). However, even this decision may be non-linear in 
age. Klasen and Woolard (2008) show that attachment to grant receiving households reduces with age, 
so that by implication the young are less likely to join the labour force. They also show that a growing 
proportion of the unemployed attach themselves to households without any employed individuals (but 
where grant income is available). By implication, these individuals are likely to be isolated from the 
labour market, and the young may be at greatest risk. However, it is indeed possible that the grant 
income from a pensioner could reduce search costs for younger individuals looking for their first jobs. 
Furthermore, Seleoane (2008: 136), contends that social grants actually stimulate entrepreneurial 
activity, in that the grants are reinvested into other income generating activities. This suggests that in 
many cases the young could in fact be connected with the labour market through grant income despite 
initial isolation. 
A clear understanding of the age and generational dimensions of labour force participation is therefore 
required to infer any responses to social grants. Burger and von Fintel (2009) illustrate that age, period 
and cohort decompositions (as per Deaton, 1985, 1997) disentangle much of the underlying features of 
unemployment, absorption and labour force participation into lifecycle and generational responses. 
They find that the rise in  labour force participation in South Africa was driven by large cohorts of 
younger generations that entered the labour market earlier than their older counterparts. These groups 
looked for their first jobs at the time when the coverage of social grants extended to large sections of 
the impoverished South African population in the post-Apartheid period. By implication, this simple 
correlation implies that social grants could have perhaps (on aggregate) caused this group to increase 
their labour supply. However, this observation requires more rigorous verification. The application of 
these decompositions does not consider any causes other than the life cycle, generational and business 
cycle responses of groups of people. By controlling for the average characteristics of cohorts born in the 
same year at different ages, it is possible to isolate what drove these demographic responses (in this 
case an intergenerational increase in labour supply). Decompositions that condition on education, for 
instance, partially eliminate the differences in participation between generations: because younger 
generations in South Africa have more years of educational attainment, they are more likely to enter the 
labour market in an attempt to reap the rewards of their investment (Burger & von Fintel, 2009). 
However, not all the intergenerational differences are accounted for by this demographic shift. The   4 
most recent surge in participation amongst the latest school leavers can be accounted for by quicker 
transitions out of education into the labour market, as a result of over-age policies that have attempted 
to normalize age profiles within schools (RSA, 1995). The idea was that these individuals would pursue 
education in adult education colleges (to obtain skills relevant to the labour market), and thereby relieve 
the pressure on an overburdened school system. Many of these individuals chose to enter the labour 
market rather than to pursue this alternative, which by implication added to the job queue (Burger & 
von Fintel, 2009).  However,  all  the differences between  older and younger generations remain 
unexplained to some degree. Here we generate counterfactual intergenerational participation profiles 
that show the behaviour of South Africans of different cohorts had they not been in households that 
received grants. This paper extends previous work to show why different generations entered the labour 
market at such different rates. The role of social grants is emphasized here. 
We construct a birth cohort panel dataset from the series of October Household Surveys from 1995 to 
1999 and the September rounds of the Labour Force Surveys from 2000 to 2007. The unit of observation 
is each birth cohort (ranging from 1930 to 1990), followed across each of the years. All the variables of 
interest are averaged for each of the members born in the relevant year, and tracked in each survey. 
Using aggregated data as a micro panel has been used in multiple situations. The benefits are that 
measurement error may be minimized and that attrition is not present. Nevertheless, the data is not 
aggregated to such a degree so that the different experiences of various groups can be controlled for. 
However, the use of conventional individual level panel estimators with grouped data has been disputed 
in the literature. Verbeek and Nijman (1992), however, show that this simple approach (without the 
need for corrections for variable sample sizes in various groups) upholds all the consistency properties 
of standard fixed effects estimators if cohort averages are constructed from more than 100 individuals. 
In each of the estimates presented below this is indeed the case. 
A simple Least Square Dummy Variable regression is run on the cohort labour force participation rates 
to decompose this variable into each of its demographic components (Deaton, 1997). The time invariant 
“fixed effects” are represented by dummy variables for each birth year and generate the generational 
profiles of participation. Dummies for each age group (which is represented by a different birth cohort in 
each survey) are included to capture the life cycle variation in participation. Time dummies are included 
for each period. However, even with the omission of a base category for each of these sets of dummies, 
this model remains unidentified due to the perfect multicollinearity between age, birth and the current 
year. The literature prescribes a number of alternatives to enforce identification, each of which 
produces different slopes for the relevant profiles (but the same first differences in profiles). Here we 
adopt the approach of Deaton (1997), which places a zero restriction on the time dummies, so that the 
business cycle variation in participation is modelled by implication. As a result, all other intertemporal 
variation in participation is diverted to intergenerational effects. However, given that semi-parametric 
techniques confirm that younger generations have entered the labour market faster than older 
generations (Branson and Wittenberg, 2007), the large “inequalities” in participation between 
generations shown below are not unfeasible, so that this assumption is deemed valid. 
In analyzing labour force participation, the broad definition of the labour force is opted for. This is 
prompted by research that shows that the large group of discouraged workers in South Africa is   5 
subjectively unhappier than the searching unemployed (Kingdon & Knight,  2006). The participation 
dummy averaged by each cohort therefore represents the participation rate of each cohort. The impact 
of social grants is controlled for in the decompositions. At the individual level, a dummy variables 
indicating attachment to a household with a recipient of the respective grants is created. By default, 
recipients themselves are also considered “attached”.  These dummies (for social pensions and child 
support grants) are averaged by cohort, so that the relevant measure is the proportion of each cohort 
living in a grant receiving household.  
The analysis is limited to the African population, as this group accounts for both the largest increases in 
labour force participation and are also the largest recipients of social grants. Separate analyses for males 
and females are conducted, as the labour market has become increasingly feminized for a variety of 
reasons (Casale & Posel, 2002). One of these is the relatively higher educational attainment of younger 
males and females compared to older generations. This impact has disproportionately affected females. 
For this reason, we also control for educational attainment in some of the scenarios presented below. 
Dummies for primary, incomplete and complete secondary, as well as tertiary education are averaged 
over cohorts (as in Burger and von Fintel, 2009). This approach captures the non-linear returns usually 
evident in education, and in particular the high degrees of convexity prominent in South Africa. 
Furthermore, as exposed at length by Burger & von Fintel (2009), the proportion of inactive individuals 
still in education controls for the impacts of overage education policies on the most recent surge in 
participation. 
We note here that the social grants variables are likely to be endogenous to participation. Not only will 
labour supply be influenced by the receipt of this non-labour income, but non-participants could be 
motivated to attach themselves to grant recipient households. This bi-causality is not accounted for by 
instrumental variable estimation at this stage. 
3  Results 
3.1  Simple Counterfactuals 
Figure 1 illustrates the basic age, period and cohort decomposition, alongside the counterfactual that 
intergenerational educational attainment differences do not exist. Firstly, the convex lifecycle 
participation effect that always exists  becomes apparent (Figure 1.2). Secondly, participation is 
procyclical, given that 1999 was the beginning of one of South Africa’s longest business cycle expansions 
(Figure 1.4). The most prominent picture, however, is the sustained long-term increase in participation 
of Africans across generations (Figure 1.3). This impact is more prominent for females than for males, 
suggesting that norms have changed regarding female participation, and that their participation 
decisions have become more similar to those o f males. Casale & Posel (2002) suggest that this 
feminization has occurred partially due to the fact that fewer females live in households headed by 
males and are married. They also contend that higher educational attainment amongst younger 
generations of Africans has caused this increase in participation. While a similar picture is true for white 
females, white males have had consistently high participation rates (Burger & von Fintel, 2009). The 
counterfactual accounts for the increases in education amongst younger generations, to explain some of   6 
this shift into the labour market. Figure 1.3 reveals that this impact matters most for the youngest 
generations of females, who would have participated less had they not received the education they had. 
However, the high gradient of each of these profiles (even after removing this impact), suggests that this 
was not the only reason for differences in participation. Most importantly, educational attainment 
hardly explains the surge in participation by the youngest generations. 
Figure 2 controls for the role that social pensions has on labour supply decisions. The turning point of 
the life cycle would have appeared much earlier had the social grants not been in place (Figure 2.2). The 
youngest groups remain largely unaffected. The cyclical shape is hardly affected (as social grants are 
unlikely to vary with the cycle when poverty is chronic) (Figure 2.4.). However, it is evident that 
participation would have been very different across generations, had social grants not been introduced. 
The gradient of the generational profiles has flattened considerably (Figure 2.3). Older generations 
would have participated more in the labour  market without the social pensions, while younger 
generations would have participated less.  This is intuitively correct, given that older generations’ 
reservation wages would increase substantially when non-labour income increases. However, for 
younger generations, it is evident that the social grants have in fact stimulated economic activity. As 
Seleoane (2008) notes, the receipt of grants has in many cases been used to generate secondary 
income. Therefore, younger generations have likely attached themselves to pension households – part 
of the grant has been used to either generate own income through entrepeneurial activity. It is also 
possible that the costs associated with job search can now be covered by the pension. The older person 
would be willing to give part of this amount to the younger person in order to benefit from the spin-off 
of possible additional income for the household once they obtain labour market income. 
For child support grants (CSG), one might expect these generational dimensions to differ somewhat, 
given that the recipients are likely to be younger mothers. However, as Figure 2.4., reveals, it is again 
older generations that would have participated more in the absence of the CSG’s. This can partially be 
accounted for by household structures in South Africa, where grandparents often take care of children, 
and therefore older individuals would qualify for the grant rather than younger generations. For younger 
generations of males, the CSGs have hardly had any impact on labour supply – this makes sense, given 
that young males are less likely to be the primary guardians of children than young females. For the 
latter group there is indeed an impact, suggesting that they would in fact have participated less without 
the CSG. Again, the argument holds that younger individuals are able to convert the grant income more 
readily into secondary income. One reason why younger males would not necessarily change their 
labour supply decisions, is that the CSG is substantially smaller in value than the pension. Therefore, 
they would not be likely to attach themselves to households that receive this grant (as opposed to the 
pension). Given that young males are unlikely to be the primary recipients of the CSG and have less of an 
incentive to join households receiving this grant, their labour supply remains largely unaffected by the 
CSG. 
   7 
3.2  Alternative Counterfactuals 
When controlling for the respective grants and education simultaneously, the pictures do not change 
substantially (not shown). This underlines that educational attainment has had a small effect on 
intergenerational participation in comparison to the social grant system. 
What remains unaccounted for, however, is the remaining bulge in participation amongst the most 
recent labour market entrants. Following Burger & von Fintel (2009) we additionally control for over-age 
schooling policies. Figures 4 and 5 present the results. It appears that accounting for educational 
attainment, the respective social grants and also the transition from school to the labour market 
delivers virtually  horizontal intergenerational  participation profiles. Therefore,  the intergenerational 
“inequalities” in participation are almost completely explained by policies introduced by the 
government. Firstly, social grants has altered the responses of all generations, with the youngest 
entering the labour market after attaching themselves to households with grant incomes and the oldest 
leaving the labour market as a result of the additional non-labour income. Secondly, policies that have 
pushed over-aged youths out of the schooling system have fuelled participation amongst the youngest 
generations. Both of these impacts on the youngest generations have different outcomes. The grants 
could possibly generate secondary economic activity, and likely facilitates connection with the labour 
market in some cases (Seleoane, 2008). The overage policy, however, adds to the job queue. This is 
particularly concerning, given that these individuals have transitioned into the labour market without 
the relevant qualifications in an economy plagued by a skills shortage. The impact has been a large rise 
in unemployment in the post-Apartheid decade for this particular group of individuals. 
 
4  Preliminary Conclusions 
 
Based on initial results, the following conclusions may be drawn: although all generations are affected 
and labour market participation would have been very different had social grants not been introduced, 
the response of younger generations to social grants differs profoundly from that of older age groups. 
Grants seem to be important for initiating entrepreneurial activities generating secondary incomes as 
well as lowering search costs. In addition, the separation of life cycle and generational effects reveals 
that intergenerational differences in participation rates are explained by policies introduced by the 
government to improve the quality of schooling by lowering the number of over-age students.  
 
 
   8 
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